‘P2P’ category

Opaque banking practices

Those doubting that we live in a ‘globalised’ world would do well to recognise that the Northern Rock mess of the last couple of weeks actually had its beginnings in the credit crisis in the United States. Across the Atlantic, American lenders lent too much, too easily, to too many sub-prime borrowers. Rather than savers’ deposits, this aggressive lending was funded instead by lenders packaging up loans for sale to banks and other financial businesses, making a profit in the process. As the lending carried on and interest rates rose, it wasn’t long before this apparent gravy train came off its tracks. Some sub-prime borrowers found themselves unable to service their debts and defaulted, on a scale large enough to cause the collapse of a number of the lenders involved. So started the credit squeeze. And with the world as interlinked as it is now, the effects were not restricted to the US. Books of dangerous US loans had been bought by firms on this side of the pond as well – and so American sub-prime bad debt issues started to bite right here in the UK. All this may still seem a long way from the Northern Rock. However, even though Northern Rock was not really lending to the UK sub-prime market, it was using the same ‘never never land’ technique to fund the lending it was doing (and it must be said at some very aggressive interest rates). This meant selling these loans to the same firms that had burned their fingers in the US sub-prime market. Before long no-one wanted to buy, and especially at the prices Northern Rock needed to make their margin on the low rates they had lent at. Inevitably the crisis hit the media. For the general public, explanations involving the knock-on effect of the American sub-prime bad debt crisis seemed far-fetched, then deeply worrying. “What’s all this about Northern Rock lending out money it didn’t have? And the banks lending between each other? What about UK sub-prime? What the Hell is going on around here?” The public had always thought that banks lent out the money their borrowers deposited, and made money by charging more interest on their loans than they paid out to their savers. A kind of self-supporting mechanism that seemed to make sense, even if people had become cynical about the profiteering games banks play as rates move around. It’s old news that most people don’t believe banks operate in their customers’ best interests, and many believe their profits are excessive. But the public had always regarded the banks as safe. Now it turns out they may not be after all. Worse still, the man on the street can’t actually assess how safe or otherwise they are. The way some of them operate is impenetrably complex, and seems almost deliberately so. People might have become used to hidden catches in the small print, but now they are faced with potentially much bigger problems, hidden away in the banks themselves. All of this naturally filled the news media with huge scary headlines. Coming in on the recent memory of the Equitable Life fiasco, and company pension shortfalls, Northern Rock’s customers understandably panicked. Reassurances from the management of Northern Rock were disregarded as swiftly as you’d expect. Similar words from the Government seemed to fan the flames of nervousness and doubt rather than help. In no time huge queues formed outside Northern Rock branches as customers demanded their hard earned savings. Billions of pounds of withdrawals later and finally the Government and Bank of England stepped in to guarantee the deposits left in Northern Rock. The whole thing looks rather a mess. The ‘blame-fest’ has only just begun… The banking industry is now left licking its wounds and trying to move on. But its reputation has suffered a real beating. It was regarded with suspicion by many people before. Now it has even greater issues to address if it is to rebuild customer confidence. In order to rebuild trust, banks will have to become radically more open and transparent. And this means some of the more exotic and opaque practices - like those that caused Northern Rock’s crisis - may have to be consigned to the City’s bin. This may leave some banks struggling on the road back to reality. Meanwhile, back at Zopa, the last few weeks have served to shed new light on the appeal of Social Lending. Since we launched we have been proud of the innovative way we have created for people to bypass banks and get a better deal directly from each other. And we have done this by lending responsibly, and not to the sub-prime market. This can be seen from our default levels of below 0.1% across all of our lending. We have also long been proud of our transparency. From very simple, and low charges, through to letting our members see who they are lending to or borrowing from. But the last few weeks have also highlighted another key attraction of Zopa’s operation - ‘tangibility’. It is easy to see exactly what is going on. People are borrowing and lending between each other, with Zopa making it much safer and easier to do. There’s no highly paid City Slicker buying and selling futures, derivatives, Bizarre Bonds or whatever to make Zopa happen. Maybe this clarity and simplicity will be our most attractive feature going forward – along with the great rates, of course.

Lender returns at Zopa

There has been much talk on our discussion boards about lender returns at Zopa and how we calculate them. Zopa loans are capital and interest loans – with borrowers repaying an amount each month that is partly a repayment of a portion of the original loan, and partly the interest accrued on the remaining outstanding loan since the last payment was made. Let’s assume a lender lends £100 to an individual borrower at an interest rate of 8% over 1 year – a perfectly realistic occurrence at Zopa. Now, because Zopa loans are capital and interest, what is actually being repaid by the borrower to this lender each month is a portion of the £100 and an interest charge of 8% on the outstanding balance over the last month. Each monthly payment by the borrower to the lender in this example will be of £8.69. In the earlier months the proportion of this amount that is interest will be higher, and will get smaller over the period of the loan as the amount of the outstanding balance gets smaller with each payment each month. So throughout the loan, interest has indeed been paid at 8%, but because this has been on a reducing loan balance, it can end up looking like a lower rate. In this example for instance, if you add up the twelve payments of £8.69, you end up with £104.28 – and thus the appearance of a return of just over 4%, not the actual 8% that was being charged in interest. But looking at it more closely, the full £100 was not earning interest for the lender for the full year, but rather interest was being earned on a reducing sum, which over the year averages something like half the original loan amount, around £50. This is how a loan at an interest rate of 8% can end up looking like a loan at 4%. It’s all down to the fact that it is a capital and interest arrangement, not interest-only. Those lenders looking to receive an actual return of 8% on their £100 obviously need to take steps to keep their £100 loaned out, to counteract the effect that a capital and interest arrangement has in terms of its gradually reducing outstanding loan amount. The easiest way to do this is to select our ‘auto re-lend’ facility. Here, as the borrower makes his payments each month, they will be automatically offered again on the same marketplace (same risk category and term) and at the same interest rate. The net effect of this re-lending, assuming the money was taken up straight away by another borrower, would be an ongoing return of just over 8% (as the interest part of the monthly repayments would be slowly increasing the amount the lender has lent out beyond the original £100). In reality there is likely to be something of a lag in the take up of these automatically re-lent amounts by borrowers, depending on how competitive an interest rate their offer is at the time. But, do remember though that before the money is re-lent, it will be sitting in your holding account (on offer again, in processing or even pending you offering it back on the markets) where it will be earning interest, currently 5% (and tied to Bank of England base rate). This will serve to help mitigate any loss of interest during the time before the money is taken up by borrowers again. There are very significant advantages associated with the capital and interest model that Zopa uses. Lenders enjoy a more sensible pattern of interest and repayments – larger, level amounts over the term of the loan – rather than tiny payments of just interest each month and then one big repayment of the original loan amount at the end of the term as they would under the interest-only alternative. In other words, this minimises the amount of money that has to be re-lent at any one time. Perhaps more significantly, borrowers benefit from a more sensible repayment pattern of ‘equal instalments’ with the loan reaching nil by the end of the term. Under an interest-only arrangement they would be faced with suddenly having to repay the full original amount in one payment at the end of the term, radically increasing the chances of default. This of course would hurt not just the borrower, but also the lender.

It’s not a Dreamcatcher, it’s a piece of String (3rd Guest blog)

philipg27 is a lender at Zopa, sometime contributor to the Discussion Board and an habitual moaner about the design of the Zopa website. [His words, not mine! Dave] Recently I was listening to a comedy program on Radio 4. In one sketch there was a Professor who cynically dismissed a number of "new-Age" ideas. As part of the sketch the Professor referred to his book "It's not a Dreamcatcher it's a piece of String". Whilst the sketch itself was not a classic the title of the book stuck in my head. Why is this at all relevant for Zopa? Well my blog piece is a bit of comment about the nature of Zopa, and re-working the book title I thought this piece could be called "It's not a Community it's a Market". I've previously seen Zopa referred to as a community, in the same way that the micro-credit institutions in the developing world work at a community level. For me Zopa fails to pass the two tests I would have for a community. 1. The two parties (borrowers and lenders) know each other. 2. There are shared communal values that encourage the repayment of debt, and conversely would stigmatise any borrower who failed to complete repayment. I am a lender at Zopa and there is clearly no way, or mechanism, that requires me to know any of the borrowers at Zopa. Regarding the second test I'm not convinced that any borrower at Zopa feels more obligated to repay a P2P loan than any other "commercial" loan. I suspect that the main motivators for borrowers to repay loans are both honesty, and the need to maintain a good credit rating. As an aside I guess the most likely group of Zopa participants to be capable and willing to form a community would be the Lenders, but such as situation would probably result in raising of the rates at Zopa and accusations of operating as a cartel! The other "myth" I want to comment on is the reference to Zopa as the eBay of P2P finance. I don't agree with this. eBay is a brilliant example of natural, highly scalable, monopoly. The more people that use eBay the greater is the incentive for both sellers and buyers to use eBay. In addition as a company eBay requires relatively little addition investment to host the second million auctions than the first. Contrast this with Zopa. Zopa will never become the single source for individuals to lend and borrow money, if only for the reason that most people probably prefer the safely of collective lending, such as via a Building Society" where the problems (and risks) of an individual defaulting are hidden from the lender. A better analogy for Zopa would be the insurance market that Edward Lloyd set up in his coffee house. Here people met and did business, thus creating an insurance market. In fact this analogy is even better when you consider the actual mechanisms employed at Lloyds of London. As well as providing a "market'' for buyers and sellers to meet Zopa provides two additional functions that mirror the market at Lloyds (Or at least as I remember them from my time there in the late 1980s). Firstly Zopa itself provides the function of assessing the risk of each and every loan, in the same way that the Lead Underwriter at Lloyds would assess the policy being requested by the Insurance Broker. Secondly Zopa provides the matching mechanism to bundle a set of loan contracts by the Lenders into a single Loan for the Borrower, in the similar way that the insurance broker at Lloyds would go around the Syndicates at Lloyds until the policy was fully underwritten. As an aside Zopa demonstrates almost perfectly what an 'O' level Economics student is taught about markets, at least on the supply side. When the price goes up the amount of money available to borrow goes up. Zopa even publish copies of this information on a weekly basis. Having banged on about Zopa being a market I should finish by commenting on why this is important. Well most importantly for Zopa the message is that Zopa should be working towards making the market easy to use rather than attempting to foster a sense of community. The website is notoriously difficult to use, it should be as simple to use as my online-stockbroker, and provide me with enough information to make informed decisions on the most effective options to lend money. I don't really need need pictures of people jumping over mountains whilst baking bread I need cash flow statements, better reporting and maybe even some idea of what's happening to my loans being processed that are currently lost in the Zopa Triangle ...

P2P Parking (First Guest Blog!)

Roger Dennis is a technology innovation consultant who has worked in a range of industries including banking. His blog is called IdeaPort. With Dave's recent blogging on parking, it seemed a natural progression to mention an intersection between information trading and peer to peer payment systems. The SpotScout Equation While Zopa blazes a trail and becomes the eBay of banking, people are looking at other applications for the eBay model. One of the more interesting ones is SpotScout which is aiming to trade information about parking spaces. While the website is less than clear about SpotScout works, Wired had a recent piece which featured an interview with the founder. The idea is that if you know you are about to leave your parking space, you send a message via your phone to SpotScout. That information is then broadcast to the mobile phones of people looking for a park. If they pull into your parking spot they pay a fee which is split between SpotScout and you. The website says they are launching soon in the States, and it’s a business which could work almost anywhere there’s parking problems. It could also easily be integrated into in-car navigation systems, and that could be a killer app. It would not be hard to imagine driving down the street, following the stress free, seductive tones of your dashboard GPS, when it announces that there should be a park available by the time you arrive, and asks if you want to reserve it. The only problem with the idea is the acronym. Does peer-to-peer-parking-payment have too many ‘p’s in it?

Social Communities and Financial Services

Years ago a man by the name of Muhammad Yunus illustrated that the very poor can be a good credit risk when the right circumstances are in place – ex: group borrowing, close knit communities with social reinforcement mechanisms, and limited access to capital across the community. This type of financial assistance is today called microfinance and, despite a complete absence of legal contracts and collateral to secure the loans, repayment rates are often as high (sometimes even higher) than 98%. That is impressive! To be more clear – the poorest of the poor in the third world are being given loans with no collateral and no legal agreements. Because the borrowers are placed in groups, and because bad behavior by one member of the group impacts the entire community’s ability to access capital going forward, everyone (or almost everyone) in the community who gets a loan pays it back – there is social pressure to pay back. Today, microfinance is prominent throughout the world and its general sociological principles have been applied to financial markets to provide much needed capital to communities at large. An excellent (and recent) example of how sociological principles have been used to reach underserved markets is Progreso Financiero, which has found a clever way of tapping into established and closely tied immigrant communities to provide a superior service to a poorly treated segment of the population. In essence, Progreso Financiero (PF) is a loan provider that positions itself in the heart of Hispanic communities to provide loans at rates of 33% (compared to 300-400% provided by payday lenders – traditionally used by this audience). Because PF treats the community with dignity instead of shame (as traditional banks do by, for example, taking mug shots of people who want to cash checks) and because they're a relevant part of the local community (their borrowers typically know each other since they're a close knit community living in a 2-3 mile radius of each other), 30% of them payback more than they owe on a monthly basis. I don’t know their historical metrics, but I suspect they're strong. For those of you who are still with me on this (sorry if I’ve ranted here), my point is this – like microfinance and other models that have evolved from it, Zopa is part of something bigger than people lending to people. We fall under the bigger umbrella of utilizing the social dynamics that exist in the society around us to provide a superior service to those who deserve it. While it may take time to get to the end vision, we will get there. Patience, persistence and passion. ~ Megan megan [@] zopa [dot] comm