‘Rates’ category

Opaque banking practices

Those doubting that we live in a ‘globalised’ world would do well to recognise that the Northern Rock mess of the last couple of weeks actually had its beginnings in the credit crisis in the United States.

Across the Atlantic, American lenders lent too much, too easily, to too many sub-prime borrowers. Rather than savers’ deposits, this aggressive lending was funded instead by lenders packaging up loans for sale to banks and other financial businesses, making a profit in the process.

As the lending carried on and interest rates rose, it wasn’t long before this apparent gravy train came off its tracks. Some sub-prime borrowers found themselves unable to service their debts and defaulted, on a scale large enough to cause the collapse of a number of the lenders involved.

So started the credit squeeze. And with the world as interlinked as it is now, the effects were not restricted to the US. Books of dangerous US loans had been bought by firms on this side of the pond as well – and so American sub-prime bad debt issues started to bite right here in the UK.

All this may still seem a long way from the Northern Rock. However, even though Northern Rock was not really lending to the UK sub-prime market, it was using the same ‘never never land’ technique to fund the lending it was doing (and it must be said at some very aggressive interest rates). This meant selling these loans to the same firms that had burned their fingers in the US sub-prime market. Before long no-one wanted to buy, and especially at the prices Northern Rock needed to make their margin on the low rates they had lent at.

Inevitably the crisis hit the media. For the general public, explanations involving the knock-on effect of the American sub-prime bad debt crisis seemed far-fetched, then deeply worrying. “What’s all this about Northern Rock lending out money it didn’t have? And the banks lending between each other? What about UK sub-prime? What the Hell is going on around here?”

The public had always thought that banks lent out the money their borrowers deposited, and made money by charging more interest on their loans than they paid out to their savers. A kind of self-supporting mechanism that seemed to make sense, even if people had become cynical about the profiteering games banks play as rates move around.

It’s old news that most people don’t believe banks operate in their customers’ best interests, and many believe their profits are excessive. But the public had always regarded the banks as safe. Now it turns out they may not be after all.

Worse still, the man on the street can’t actually assess how safe or otherwise they are. The way some of them operate is impenetrably complex, and seems almost deliberately so. People might have become used to hidden catches in the small print, but now they are faced with potentially much bigger problems, hidden away in the banks themselves.

All of this naturally filled the news media with huge scary headlines. Coming in on the recent memory of the Equitable Life fiasco, and company pension shortfalls, Northern Rock’s customers understandably panicked.

Reassurances from the management of Northern Rock were disregarded as swiftly as you’d expect. Similar words from the Government seemed to fan the flames of nervousness and doubt rather than help. In no time huge queues formed outside Northern Rock branches as customers demanded their hard earned savings.

Billions of pounds of withdrawals later and finally the Government and Bank of England stepped in to guarantee the deposits left in Northern Rock. The whole thing looks rather a mess. The ‘blame-fest’ has only just begun…

The banking industry is now left licking its wounds and trying to move on. But its reputation has suffered a real beating. It was regarded with suspicion by many people before. Now it has even greater issues to address if it is to rebuild customer confidence.

In order to rebuild trust, banks will have to become radically more open and transparent. And this means some of the more exotic and opaque practices - like those that caused Northern Rock’s crisis - may have to be consigned to the City’s bin. This may leave some banks struggling on the road back to reality.

Meanwhile, back at Zopa, the last few weeks have served to shed new light on the appeal of Social Lending. Since we launched we have been proud of the innovative way we have created for people to bypass banks and get a better deal directly from each other. And we have done this by lending responsibly, and not to the sub-prime market. This can be seen from our default levels of below 0.1% across all of our lending.

We have also long been proud of our transparency. From very simple, and low charges, through to letting our members see who they are lending to or borrowing from.

But the last few weeks have also highlighted another key attraction of Zopa’s operation - ‘tangibility’. It is easy to see exactly what is going on. People are borrowing and lending between each other, with Zopa making it much safer and easier to do. There’s no highly paid City Slicker buying and selling futures, derivatives, Bizarre Bonds or whatever to make Zopa happen.

Maybe this clarity and simplicity will be our most attractive feature going forward – along with the great rates, of course.

Lender returns at Zopa

There has been much talk on our discussion boards about lender returns at Zopa and how we calculate them.

Zopa loans are capital and interest loans – with borrowers repaying an amount each month that is partly a repayment of a portion of the original loan, and partly the interest accrued on the remaining outstanding loan since the last payment was made.

Let’s assume a lender lends £100 to an individual borrower at an interest rate of 8% over 1 year – a perfectly realistic occurrence at Zopa.

Now, because Zopa loans are capital and interest, what is actually being repaid by the borrower to this lender each month is a portion of the £100 and an interest charge of 8% on the outstanding balance over the last month. Each monthly payment by the borrower to the lender in this example will be of £8.69. In the earlier months the proportion of this amount that is interest will be higher, and will get smaller over the period of the loan as the amount of the outstanding balance gets smaller with each payment each month.

So throughout the loan, interest has indeed been paid at 8%, but because this has been on a reducing loan balance, it can end up looking like a lower rate. In this example for instance, if you add up the twelve payments of £8.69, you end up with £104.28 – and thus the appearance of a return of just over 4%, not the actual 8% that was being charged in interest.

But looking at it more closely, the full £100 was not earning interest for the lender for the full year, but rather interest was being earned on a reducing sum, which over the year averages something like half the original loan amount, around £50.

This is how a loan at an interest rate of 8% can end up looking like a loan at 4%. It’s all down to the fact that it is a capital and interest arrangement, not interest-only.

Those lenders looking to receive an actual return of 8% on their £100 obviously need to take steps to keep their £100 loaned out, to counteract the effect that a capital and interest arrangement has in terms of its gradually reducing outstanding loan amount.

The easiest way to do this is to select our ‘auto re-lend’ facility. Here, as the borrower makes his payments each month, they will be automatically offered again on the same marketplace (same risk category and term) and at the same interest rate.

The net effect of this re-lending, assuming the money was taken up straight away by another borrower, would be an ongoing return of just over 8% (as the interest part of the monthly repayments would be slowly increasing the amount the lender has lent out beyond the original £100).

In reality there is likely to be something of a lag in the take up of these automatically re-lent amounts by borrowers, depending on how competitive an interest rate their offer is at the time. But, do remember though that before the money is re-lent, it will be sitting in your holding account (on offer again, in processing or even pending you offering it back on the markets) where it will be earning interest, currently 5% (and tied to Bank of England base rate). This will serve to help mitigate any loss of interest during the time before the money is taken up by borrowers again.

There are very significant advantages associated with the capital and interest model that Zopa uses.

Lenders enjoy a more sensible pattern of interest and repayments – larger, level amounts over the term of the loan – rather than tiny payments of just interest each month and then one big repayment of the original loan amount at the end of the term as they would under the interest-only alternative. In other words, this minimises the amount of money that has to be re-lent at any one time.

Perhaps more significantly, borrowers benefit from a more sensible repayment pattern of ‘equal instalments’ with the loan reaching nil by the end of the term. Under an interest-only arrangement they would be faced with suddenly having to repay the full original amount in one payment at the end of the term, radically increasing the chances of default. This of course would hurt not just the borrower, but also the lender.

Zopa And Conduits

You might have seen a lot of news in the broadsheets about problems with American sub-prime mortgages. In the last few years it was very easy to get a US mortgage despite a poor credit history. Many borrowers took on loans they couldn’t handle, and the recent drop in American house prices left them in negative equity. As dollar interest rates rose, they weren’t able to refinance and were forced to default.

Countrywide is America’s biggest mortgage broker. Right now, 20% of their sub-prime borrowers aren’t able to make their monthly payments. As the problem becomes more visible, reports of mis-selling and deceptive sales practices are surfacing. Brokers seemed to have failed miserably in explaining the risks of complex mortgages, like Option-ARMs, which can only be properly valued with the use of interest rate volatility curves. (I don’t really understand my last sentence either.)

If these problems only affected poor Americans, the press here probably wouldn’t have noticed. (Genetically they won’t leave Zone 1 without being bought dinner!) But it’s not just US institutions that are suffering. As I blogged about before, the majority of loans are not owned by the institution that originally contracted them. The beneficiary of a Countrywide borrower’s payment’s will often be an off-shore trust, which in turn distributes those payments to its bond and share holders. Countrywide are just collecting cash and answering phones.

The ultimate lenders to these unfortunate American home buyers are a picture of financial globalisation. They range from Scottish pension funds, through French hedge funds, all the way the state banks of the People’s Republic of China. The FT made a handy world map of losers, rather than listings them all!

In my last blog post I said that it was sort of possible for cash deposits to fund things like mortgages, but it was complicated. Well, complicated doesn’t really put off investment bankers (and good for them too), especially not Barclays.

This is how it works. Commercial paper is a form of short-term bond. It’s sold by a highly credit worthy institution to money market funds and banks. (Banks buy them to back your ISA.) Typically it will be a promise of a single payment after 90 days. Commercial paper can be rolled over, so that the principle payment is funded by issuing fresh paper. The fresh issue might attract a different interest rate to the old issue depending on the market. Rolling over commercial paper is a very flexible form of variable rate borrowing. A bit like an overdraft for billion dollar companies.

Instead of just selling bonds and shares to fund their loan portfolios, our off-shore trust might issue commercial paper as well. If the trust’s portfolio consists of credit card debts, or variable rate personal loans, payments on the commercial paper will match the returns of the portfolio. Higher base interest rates will push up commercial paper rates in parallel with credit card rates.

Trusts that are mostly (or entirely) funded by commercial paper are often referred to as ‘commercial paper conduits‘. They act as big pipes. Sucking cheap money from the commercial paper to pour into more profitable markets. A conduit is typically created and sponsored by an investment bank. The conduit is an independent(-ish) entity, the bank just provides it with services. If the conduit goes under, the bank isn’t liable for the losses.

Commercial paper is supposed to be very very safe. If there are any doubts about an issuer’s credit they might not be able to sell their paper at all. So, what happens if our squillion dollar trust of defaulting sub-prime mortgages can’t roll over it’s commercial paper? The same as any business with a payment problem. It arranges an overdraft with its bank. A sensible business will have a pre-arranged overdraft to cover crises.

The conduits were sensible, so a lot of banks are finding themselves obliged to extend billion dollar overdrafts. Barclays extended a loan of $1.6 billion to Cairn High Grade Funding last week. (Barclays also took an emergency loan from the Bank of England, but claim this was just to cover a failed money transfer.)

Since the UK enjoys a higher burden of personal debt than the US, there’s real concern that their crisis will spread our way. Even if securitization is less common here, our banks are still exposed to losses from US sub-prime. And every lender will have to raise their rates if the commercial paper markets stay nervous.

What does this mean for Zopa? It’s probably quite good news for us and our members. If banks start running out of money, or buyers for their loans, Zopa has less competition. The funds on our markets are raised from private individuals who are less susceptible to shocks than already indebted institutions. Plus, any really big financial disaster, like a retail bank going under, should make us seem more credible by comparison!

The wobbles echoing out from the US prove the unique integrity the Zopa platform offers. The assurance of a direct claim backed by a real person is more valuable to lenders than ever.

Slow, slow, quick, quick, Zopa

Avid Zopa lenders might have noticed a slow down in their money being lent out over the last few weeks - so I thought I’d take a quick opportunity to explain what’s going on.

The reason for the slowdown is that the number of credit worthy borrowers applying to Zopa has dropped recently - as we’d expect it to in December. The loan business is highly seasonal with fluctuations in quality through the year, and December is the hardest month of the year to find good quality borrowers.

So, although you might be seeing things move a little slower than normal, it’s because we’re doing our best to look after your interests&and don’t forget you earn 4.25% on money that isn’t lent out all the time that money is at Zopa.

Now - the good news is that January is not only a new year, but a major turnaround in lending. January has something like double the borrower volumes of any other month - as everyone works out just how much they spent over Christmas, and wants to sort it out. And to make it even better, the quality of borrowers shoots up as well.

So - in summary, hang on in there, enjoy your Christmas and New Year, and get ready to lend in January.

More lenders needed!

Zopa is a funny beast - sort of a pushmi-pullyu if you like. Sometimes we need more borrowers (to help our lenders), sometimes we need more lenders (to help our borrowers).

Currently - we’re after lenders. Why? Well, we’re about to launch a big campaign about having the lowest rates in the UK (Don’t believe us? Check out MoneySupermarket!) - which means we’re about to get loads of borrowers. Only right now, we don’t have enough lenders to lend to them all! :-(

So - if you’re interested in earning a lovely rate of return on your money (and benefitting from the Zopa Lenders bonus), and earning the undying love and gratitude of hords of Zopa borrowers - send us your money now! It’s really easy, just join up, and follow the instructions to transfer your money to Zopa and place it on the markets. Go on, you know you want to.

And now I’ll get off my marketing soap box. Thank you.

Zopa lenders rock the best buy tables!

You guys are just great - and here’s the proof! Zopa lenders have the best value loans in the UK right now, by a mile. This is the first best buy table you’ve appeared in - congratulations! We’re working hard to get you in more and more best buy tables, so that borrowers across the UK get the message that people are better than banks and the Zopa word gets out to more and more people. Thank you from everyone at Zopa…and your borrowers!